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Russell . Weintraub **
HIS Article focuses on subject matter jurisdiction to affect the par-
ent-child relationship in the absence of personal jurisdiction over
all claimants to the child's custody (typically without personal juris-
diction over both parents) and on problems of sister states' extension of
full faith and credit to custody decrees. Two recent developments invite
this focus: first is the Houston [First District] court of civil appeals' hold-
ing in Dillon v. Medellin;I second, closely related but not as recent, is 28
U.S.C. § 1738A, passed as part of the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act
of 1980,2 which requires sister-state custody decrees to be enforced and not
to be modified.
I. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO CUSTODY DECREES
A. Barriers to Full Faith and Credit
Two problems are encountered when urging full faith and credit to cus-
tody decrees. First, custody decrees are modifiable. Secondly, does due
process forbid full faith and credit to a custody decree if the court render-
ing the decree did not have personal jurisdiction over both parents?
All custody decrees are modifiable in the light of changed circum-
stances. 3 While this modifiability is necessary to protect the best interests
of the child, it is an embarrassment to urging full faith and credit to sister-
state custody decrees. No state need give more full faith and credit to a
* This Article is a revision of a speech presented at the State Bar of Texas Advanced
Family Law Course, Dallas, Texas, August 17, 1982.
Copyright 1982 by Russell J. Weintraub.
** B.A., New York University; J.D., Harvard University. John B. Connally Professor
of Civil Jurisprudence, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. The author is grateful
to Professor John J. Sampson of the University of Texas at Austin School of Law for
thoughtful criticism of the manuscript.
1. 627 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981), writ refd n~r.e per
curiam, 633 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1982). The author consulted with counsel for the father.
2. Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(b), 94 Stat. 3566, 3568-71 (1980) (codified in part at 28
U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980)).
3. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (continuing
jurisdiction over all matters in connection with the child).
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judgment than that judgment would receive in the state that rendered it.4
Because a custody decree can be modified in the original jurisdiction, a
sister state may also modify the decree.5 A court that is intent on changing
a sister-state decree can, therefore, ostensibly find that circumstances have
changed and then proceed to modify the decree in its discretion. This
practice encouraged the national scandal of snatch, run, and relitigate. 6
Section 1738A of the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, 7 dis-
cussed in section II(B), addresses this problem.
The Supreme Court's ambiguous holding in May v. Anderson 8 addresses
the issue of whether a court may defer to the custody decree of a sister state
when that state did not have personal jurisdiction over both spouses. The
Court had previously held in Williams v. North Carolina9 that a valid ex
parte divorce may be acquired in the state where one of the spouses, typi-
cally the petitioner, is domiciled. The state in which the divorce is ob-
tained need not have personal jurisdiction over the other spouse, nor be
the marital domicile, nor be the scene of any of the acts that are grounds
for divorce. Although a valid ex parte divorce may be obtained, some rea-
sons necessitate personal jurisdiction over the other spouse. Without per-
sonal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, that spouse may collaterally
attack the divorce court's essential jurisdictional finding of domicile of the
petitioner.' 0 To obtain a valid money judgment for such items as alimony,
support, and attorney's fees, personal jurisdiction must be exercised over
the obligated spouse.II The initial determination and any termination of a
spouse's rights to support require personal jurisdiction over that spouse.12
May v. Anderson raises the question of whether personal jurisdiction over
a spouse is necessary in order to render a custody decree that will with-
stand an assault by the absent spouse asserting a due process requirement
of complete de novo review. 13
May involved a Wisconsin divorce in which Wisconsin had been the
marital domicile. The petitioner's wife left Wisconsin with the children
and went to Ohio. The husband then brought suit in Wisconsin for di-
vorce and petitioned for custody of the children. Wisconsin granted the
husband a divorce and also gave him custody of the children. At that time
Wisconsin did not have a long-arm statute that would give it personal ju-
risdiction over the recently departed wife. 14 The Wisconsin custody decree
4. See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614-15 (1947).
5. Id at 613-14.
6. See, e.g., People ex rel. Bukovich v. Bukovich, 39 Ill. 2d 76, 233 N.E.2d 382 (1968).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a), (c) (Supp. IV 1980).
8. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
9. 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (often called Williams Ito distinguish it from Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945)).
10. Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex re. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 77(i) (1971).
12. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
13. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
14. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (jurisdiction




was rendered, therefore, without personal jurisdiction over the wife. Nev-
ertheless, armed with this decree and accompanied by an Ohio police of-
ficer, the husband obtained the children from their mother. Four years
later the wife retained the children in Ohio after their visitation time had
expired. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in Ohio to regain
possession of the children. The Ohio courts, not wishing to encourage
child snatching, ordered the return of the children. The United States
Supreme Court reversed in an opinion that has continued to puzzle
commentators.
The Court in May v. Anderson split 4-1-2-1 and its members wrote four
opinions.' 5 The case would, therefore, raise substantial questions as to
where the court stood even if each individual opinion were a model of
clarity. The plurality opinion by Justice Burton, however, is completely
ambiguous on the crucial issue of whether or not Ohio can defer to the
Wisconsin decree if it so desires, or whether the mother, as a matter of due
process, is entitled to a de novo determination of custody because the court
rendering the original decree did not have personal jurisdiction over her. 16
To add to the confusion, Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion,
assumes that the plurality opinion is simply deciding that full faith and
credit does not require Ohio to enforce the Wisconsin decree, but that
Ohio may defer to Wisconsin if it so wishes.' 7 Justice Jackson, in a dissent
in which he is joined by Justice Reed, assumes that the plurality holds that
Ohio could not constitutionally defer to the Wisconsin decree.
18
B. Section 1738A
The Supreme Court of the United States has not clarified whether Jus-
tice Frankfurter's or Justice Jackson's interpretation of May v. Anderson is
correct, but the consensus adopts Justice Frankfurter's view. Section
1738A,19 section 3 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,20 and
15. Justice Burton wrote for the plurality of four. 345 U.S. at 528-35. Justice Frank-
furter concurred. Id at 535-36. Justice Jackson dissented in an opinion joined by Justice
Reed. 1d at 536-42. Justice Minton dissented separately. Id at 542-43. Justice Clark took
no part. Id. at 535.
16. Compare the following two passages in Justice Burton's opinion:
The question presented is whether, in a habeas corpus proceeding attack-
ing the right of a mother to retain possession of her minor children, an Ohio
court must give full faith and credit to a Wisconsin decree awarding custody
of the children to their father when that decree is obtained by the father in an
exparte divorce action in a Wisconsin court which had no personal jurisdic-
tion over the mother.
Id. at 528-29.
We find it unnecessary to determine the children's legal domicile because,
even if it be with their father, that does not give Wisconsin, certainly as
against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it must have in order to deprive
their mother of her personal right to their immediate possession.
Id at 534 (footnote omitted).
17. Id at 535-36.
18. Id. at 536-37.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980).
20. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 116, 122-23 (1979) [herein-
after cited as UCCJA § -, 9 U.L.A. at -].
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section 11.045 of the Texas Family Code2 ' all adopt the Frankfurter ap-
proach. Each of these enactments articulates bases for subject matter juris-
diction in custody cases that do not include personal jurisdiction over all
claimants and requires enforcement of sister-state decrees rendered under
similar jurisdictional bases.22 Section 1738A uses the power of Congress
under article IV, section 1 of the Constitution to "prescribe" "the effect" of
state "public acts, records, and judicial proceedings. ' 23 Under this provi-
sion Congress can extend the scope of full faith and credit provided it does
not violate due process. Thus, the constitutional validity of section 1738A
turns on accepting Justice Frankfurter's view of May P. Anderson.
Section 1738A mandates that if a state has exercised custody jurisdiction
on one of the bases set forth in the section, every other state must enforce
and, with one exception, not modify that custody decree. 24 The section
delineates four bases for custody jurisdiction, which superficially seem to
be the same as the bases for jurisdiction in section 3 of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and section 11.045 of the Texas Family Code.
The four bases are: (1) the forum is the "home state" of the child (the
child has lived there with a person acting as parent for six months immedi-
ately preceding the exercise of jurisdiction);25 (2) the child and at least one
contestant have a significant connection with the forum and substantial
evidence concerning the child's welfare is located there;26 (3) the child is
physically present in the forum, and an emergency has arisen requiring
protection of the child's welfare; 27 and (4) no other state has one of the
other three bases for jurisdiction, or if a state does have jurisdiction, it has
deferred to the forum as a more appropriate site for custody determina-
tion. 28 One important difference between the jurisdictional bases in sec-
tion 1738A and both the Uniform Act 29 and the Family Code30 is that in
section 1738A the significant connection basis can be exercised only if no
other state qualifies as the child's home state.3' This provision is probably
an improvement over the Uniform Act and the Family Code because "sig-
nificant connection" is not defined and has been used by forums outside
the home state for extremely questionable custody modifications. 32
The one exception in which section 1738A permits modification of a
21. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.045 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a), (c) (Supp. IV 1980); UCCJA §§ 3, 14, 9 U.L.A. at 122-23,
153-54; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.045- .053 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
23. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 n.2 (1933): "The constitutional
provision giving Congress power to prescribe the effect to be given to acts, records and pro-
ceedings would have been quite unnecessary had it not been intended that Congress should
have a latitude broader than that given the courts by the full faith and credit clause alone."
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
25. Id § 1738A(c)(2)(A).
26. Id § 1738A(c)(2)(B).
27. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(C).
28. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(D).
29. UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. at 122-23.
30. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.045 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
32. See infra note 37.
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sister-state custody decree after the sister state has exercised jurisdiction
consistently with the Act is if the original court no longer has jurisdiction
or has declined to exercise it.a3 Under section 1738A(d), however, a court
that originally had jurisdiction consistent with the section retains that ju-
risdiction so long as its state law permits and so long as its state remains
the residence of the child or of any contestant. 34 These provisions can give
rise to anomalous results under certain fact situations. For example, as-
sume a court at the marital domicile exercises jurisdiction consistently with
section 1738A and grants custody to the mother. The mother and child
then move out of the state and reside elsewhere. The father remains at the
marital domicile. After five years have elapsed, the father brings a suit at
the marital domicile to modify the custody decree. The original court ex-
ercises its continuing jurisdiction to modify its own decree and awards cus-
tody to the father. Under section 1738A the state where the mother and
child have been living for five years would have to enforce and not modify
that decree.
Two mitigating factors make this scenario unlikely. First of all, judges
are not ogres, and a court in the marital domicile would be unlikely to
exercise jurisdiction to modify under such circumstances. Moreover, in
most states a statutory provision would prevent or discourage such an ex-
treme exercise of the continuing jurisdiction to modify. In Texas section
11.052 of the Family Code prevents a court from exercising its continuing
jurisdiction when the mother and child have resided elsewhere for more
than six months.3 5 Section 3 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, unlike Family Code section 11.045, controls jurisdiction to modify as
well as original jurisdiction.36 Under the Uniform Act, therefore, one of
the four bases for custody jurisdiction would have to persist in order for
modification jurisdiction to be available.3 7 Secondly, the exercise of juris-
diction to modify under the extreme circumstances of the hypothetical
would probably violate due process, 38 as would section 1738A if applied to
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
34. Id § 1738A(c)(1), (d).
35. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1i.052(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
36. UCCJA § 3(a), 9 U.L.A. at 122.
37. Id. § 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. at 122, does permit modification if "the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection" with the forum and "substantial evidence con-
cerning the child's" welfare is available. "Significant connection" is not defined, and thus
this provision can be used to justify modification in questionable circumstances. Cf. In re
Marriage of Weinstein, 87 Ill. App. 3d 101, 408 N.E.2d 952 (1980) (significant connection
with forum justifies custody determination contrary to that reached at marital domicile);
Hadley v. Hadley, 394 So. 2d 769 (La. App.) (forum acquires significant connection with
child before it becomes child's home state), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d 622 (La. 1981).
UCCJA § 3(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. at 122, permits modification if the child is physically present
in the forum and an emergency arises concerning the child's welfare. This provision can
also be abused. See Webb v. Webb, 245 Ga. 650, 266 S.E.2d 463 (1980) (emergency provi-
sion used to permit modification of forum's prior decree after mother and child have resided
in another state for over a year), cert. dism'dfor want ofjurisdiction, 451 U.S. 493 (1981), and
infra part II, discussing Dillon v. Medellin, 627 S.W.2d 737 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1981), writ ref'dn.r.e per curiam, 633 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1982).
38. Cf Corliss v. Smith, 560 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ) (due
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mandate enforcement.
The strangest aspect of section 1738A is that it appears to be a blatant
exercise of legislative overkill. At one time sister-state custody decrees
were widely flouted, 39 but under the salutary influence of widespread criti-
cism4° and of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the states have
increasingly recognized sister-state decrees. 41 At least on the appellate
level, finding a custody decision that encourages the tactics of snatch, run,
and relitigate is difficult. 42 In 1983, three years after the date of its enact-
ment, section 1738A creates more problems than it solves.
II. DILLON V MEDELLIN: PERSONAL VERSUS SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION
A. Relationship Between Personal and Subject Matter
Jurisdiction in Custody Cases
The civil appeals decision in Dillon v. Medellin43 raises two issues: first,
the distinction between personal and subject matter jurisdiction under the
Texas Family Code in suits affecting the parent-child relationship; and sec-
ondly, the power of a Texas court to protect a child in an emergency when
the managing conservator and the child have had their principal residence
outside of Texas for over six months.
In Dillon a divorce was granted in Texas, the marital domicile, and the
mother was designated managing conservator of the couple's only child.
The mother moved to Louisiana with the child and remarried. After the
mother and child had been living in Louisiana for two and one-half years,
the father filed a petition in Texas to modify the custody decree in which
he alleged that the child was being abused in Louisiana. The motion was
filed while the child was still in Texas at the end of an annual visit with the
father. The mother made a special appearance and asserted that under
section 11.052 of the Family Code 4 the Texas court that rendered the orig-
inal custody decree could not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify,
because the mother and child had been living outside of Texas for more
than six months. The father then amended his petition to request an origi-
nal custody decree under section 11.045 of the Family Code.45 The father
alleged two grounds for jurisdiction: first, the significant connection
process does not permit exercise of jurisdiction over mother to modify custody decree when
mother had resided outside of state with the children for over three years).
39. See. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5.3C (2d ed.
1980).
40. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act." 4 Legislative
Remedyfor Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1969).
41. See Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modocations, 65 CALIF.
L. REV. 978 (1977).
42. But see supra note 37 (citing cases from Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana).
43. 627 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981), writ re/d n.r.e. per
curiam, 633 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1982).
44. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.052(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
45. 627 S.W.2d at 739.
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ground, because the child's visits constituted a significant connection be-
tween the child and Texas, and there was substantial evidence in the state
concerning the child's welfare; 46 and secondly, the physical presence of the
child coupled with an emergency affecting the child's welfare.47 The trial
court granted the father's petition under these provisions of section 11.045
and also under Family Code section 14.10(c), 48 which permits a temporary
order in habeas corpus proceedings to protect the child. The Houston
[First District] court of appeals reversed and ordered the father's petition
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 49 The court of appeals held that the
exercise of jurisdiction over the mother violated due process despite the
fact that the facts satisfied two provisions of the custody long-arm statute,
Family Code section 11.051:50 The child had been conceived in Texas,5 '
and the mother had resided with the child in Texas. 52 The court of appeals
also indicated that Louisiana was a more convenient forum to litigate is-
sues concerning the child's welfare.53 The Texas Supreme Court declined
a full review on the ground that no reversible error was committed. The
court took the unusual step, however, of issuing a per curiam opinion indi-
cating it agreed with the court of appeals that Louisiana was a more appro-
priate forum, but expressly declining to rule whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the mother would violate due process. 54
This result may well be right, but it is not for the reason given by the
court of appeals that there was lack of personal jurisdiction over the
mother. Personal jurisdiction over the mother is unnecessary for the exer-
cise of subject matter jurisdiction under Family Code section 11.045, un-
less Justice Jackson was correct in his May v. Anderson dissent,55 and the
consensus is that he was not.56 A court can, however, decline to exercise
jurisdiction that it does have, and arguably Dillon raises a due process ob-
jection to a Texas court's exercise of jurisdiction to modify the original
decree. Although the mother could not have been subjected to personal
jurisdiction, the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction would have required
her, as a practical matter, to litigate the charges of abuse in a very inconve-
nient forum.
B. Protecting a Child When Continuing Jurisdiction Cannot Be Used
What can a Texas court do in a case like Dillon when there is an allega-
tion of serious danger to a child present in Texas, but the child and the
managing conservator have resided outside Texas for more than six
46. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.045(a)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
47. Id § 11.045(a)(2)(B).
48. Id § 14.10(c).
49. 627 S.W.2d at 737.
50. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
51. See id § 11.051(1).
52. See id § 11.051(3).
53. 627 S.W.2d at 741.
54. 633 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Tex. 1982).
55. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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months? The Texas court can grant a temporary order to protect the child
under Family Code section 14.10(c) 57 if the proceeding is for habeas
corpus and under Family Code section 11. 11 if it is not.58 The Texas court
should then transfer the case to the state where the child and managing
conservator have been residing to determine the merits of the abuse
charges. The Texas Supreme Court recognized this power in Marshall v.
Wilson." In Marshall a Texas divorce was granted and the mother was
made managing conservator. After the mother and child had lived outside
of Texas for six years, the father took the child from Tennessee and
brought her to Texas. The mother filed a petition for habeas corpus in
Texas. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the mother was entitled to
prevail under Family Code section 14.10(d) 60 "by mere proof that she has
an order making her the managing conservator."'61 The court, however,
expressly noted that "[tihe record is devoid of evidence of 'a serious imme-
diate question concerning the welfare of the child.' "62
III. CONCLUSION
Dillon illustrates the subtle relationship between personal and subject
matter jurisdiction in custody cases. Despite the doubts originally raised
by May v. Anderson, a court almost certainly has power to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction to affect the parent-child relationship without personal
jurisdiction over both parents. Equally certain is that another state does
not violate due process when it enforces that decree against the absent par-
ent. The exercise of this subject matter jurisdiction in a forum inconve-
nient for the nonresident parent, however, may violate due process. This
violation is most likely to occur when subject matter jurisdiction is exer-
cised to modify a prior decree that gave custody to the parent over whom
the modifying court does not have personal jurisdiction.
Cases like Dillon reveal the awesome complexities of jurisdictional
problems and warn against making broad assertions concerning clear dis-
tinctions between personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Personal and
subject matter jurisdiction are different, but they are also closely related.
The exact nature of this relationship is one that will not cease to engross
the family law practitioner.
57. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
58. Id § 11.11.
59. 616 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1981).
60. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
61. 616 S.W.2d at 934.
62. Id (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)).
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